INTRODUCTION

Formal Commitments and States' Interests: Compliance in International Relations
International relations scholars have studied states' compliance with international commitments from a variety of perspectives, including rationalist, 3 constructivist, 4 institutionalist, 5 legal, 6 and liberal 7 viewpoints. The articles in the forum target puzzles that Luck and Doyle (2004) identify in the compliance literature, including (1) the role of domestic institutions, (2) the consequences of strategic shifts in the international landscape, (3) the effect of power and equity gaps, (4) temporal dynamics in states' compliance patterns, and (5) variation in compliance rates across issue areas.
First, the articles in the forum identify problems with existing measures of compliance in the international relations literature. Some authors treat compliance as a continuous variable rather than a dichotomous one, recognizing that most cases of compliance fall in between these extremes. For example, Hillebrecht examines the deterrent effects of the International Criminal Court's (ICC) activities in Libya on additional cases of violence against civilians. Conflict was not completely abated, but it was reduced, demonstrating the value of a more continuous measure for compliance.
Second, domestic institutions might also play an important role for determining states' propensities for compliance with international agreements. One might expect that democratic leaders who are more sensitive to audience costs will be less compliant with agreements in issue areas in which the costs of compliance are higher, whereas leaders in nondemocracies are less concerned with public opinion, so in a paradoxical way we might observe more compliance in those regimes when high costs are involved. Carneiro and Apolinário Jr. demonstrate how domestic institutions influence compliance in their study of economic targeting of leaders in Africa and human rights behavior.
Third, the time dimension is crucial for compliance, and yet it is hardly addressed or incorporated in empirical studies of compliance. In other words, how does compliance change over time? Does it increase on the dyadic level, and if so, does it vary by issue area? How does compliance in the initial stages of interactions change the incentives and preferences of the players in later interactions? Several articles in this collection address these important issues. Hug and Wegmann address the question of how signatories of human rights conventions comply with their obligations. The authors find that human rights violations are time dependent, with many states experiencing delays between treaty ratification and treaty compliance. Similarly, 3 Downs and Jones 2002; Downs, Rocke, and Barsoom 1996; Simmons 2000 Simmons , 2002 Simmons , 2009 Tomz 2007; von Stein 2005. 4 Chayes and Chayes 1998; Haas 1989. Anderson, Mitchell, and Schilling use time-varying parameter models and show that shared IGO memberships reduce the likelihood of militarized conflict in some historical periods (Cold War) but increase the chances for dyadic conflict in other periods (post-Cold War). They connect the temporal variation in the IGO-conflict relationship to the compliance literature by thinking about coercion, self-interest, and legitimacy mechanisms for compliance. Finally, the articles consider how the design of international institutions and treaties and their connections with other international actors influence the chances for compliance. Hillebrecht examines the 2011 crisis in Libya to determine if the International Criminal Court had a deterrent effect on civilian casualties. Her analyses show that statements and arrest warrants issued by the ICC reduced violence against civilians in the Libyan conflict and that compliance with the human rights regime was enhanced by cooperation between the ICC and the UN Security Council. Hillebrecht's findings on the connections between global actors for better compliance are similar to Hug and Wegmann's findings that states are more likely to comply with human rights treaties if they are embedded in a regional system related to the regime. The design of IGOs is also important for explaining variance in compliance rates. Anderson, Mitchell, and Schilling show that security-based, highly institutionalized IGOs are best suited among all IGOs to prevent militarized conflict between member states.
The articles build upon the rich compliance literature in international relations while pushing the literature forward by showing how we must examine factors such as issue area, time, regime characteristics, and treaty design to fully account for the variation in observed compliance rates. They collectively show that we need richer measures of compliance to capture the evolving nature of this important concept. The forum answers a call for greater attention to the ecology and microfoundations embedded in the question of state compliance with international commitments.
Political scientists have enhanced our understanding of the conditions under which states' compliance with international commitments is most likely to occur. The articles in this forum demonstrate that compliance incentives may vary over time, that they are mediated by domestic politics, and that interactions between specific treaties or institutions with other regional or global actors are important for promoting states' compliance with international agreements. The UK's threat of exit from the European Union has serious implications for its own human rights practices as well as other states' behavior in the region. Increased conflict among IGO members in the post-Cold War environment must be managed by IGOs with more security-based, institutionalist mechanisms for conflict management. Variation in domestic institutions creates needs for stronger institutions to minimize variance in compliance.
We realize that the four articles represent only a small block in the ongoing research on compliance. More research needs to be conducted on the various dimensions of compliance, as identified earlier. For example, a useful extension of the research in this forum can be to investigate how issue area and issue characteristics influence the chances for compliance. In areas where the costs of complying are higher, like security agreements, there may be greater variance in compliance associated with states' regime types, whereas in areas like trade and the environment, the variance in compliance could be lower. Russia's lack of compliance with agreements signed with Ukraine settling their land borders, for example, was driven by its heightened security threats as NATO increased cooperation with Ukraine. We could also examine how power asymmetries between states influence the chances for compliance across issue areas, time, and space. China and Japan have engaged in serious confrontations over the Diaoyu/Senkaku islands, yet relations between China and Brunei have been more cooperative due to China's strong economic power position.
8 Finally, there is more to be learned by studying the delays states experience in complying with interstate treaties. States may delay compliance in ways that are strategic, rather than merely failing to implement treaty provisions due to managerial problems. To understand compliance in international relations, we must consider a wide variety of factors that influence states' incentives for cooperation. As the ongoing situations in Eastern Europe and Asia make clear, a better understanding of compliance is crucial to international security, wealth, and justice.
